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Abstract The paper analyzes how to comply with an emission constraint, which restricts
the use of an established energy technique, given the two options to save energy and to invest
in two alternative energy techniques. These techniques differ in their deterioration rates and
the investment lags of the corresponding capital stocks. Thus, the paper takes a medium-term
perspective on climate change mitigation, where the time horizon is too short for technolog-
ical change to occur, but long enough for capital stocks to accumulate and deteriorate. It is
shown that, in general, only one of the two alternative techniques prevails in the stationary
state, although, both techniques might be utilized during the transition phase. Hence, while
in a static economy only one technique is efficient, this is not necessarily true in a dynamic
economy.
Keywords Climate change mitigation · Dynamic characteristics · Emission targets ·
Environmental policy · Optimal structural change · Replacement of energy techniques ·
Static versus dynamic efficiency · Time-lagged dynamic optimization
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1 Introduction
Many environmental problems, humankind faces today, are of a long-run nature. A prime
example is anthropogenic climate change, which is caused by the emissions of so-called
greenhouse gases. These gases, in particular CO2, exhibit long life times in the atmosphere
and, thus, accumulate over time and incur a long lasting effect on global climatic conditions.
In industrialized countries, the biggest sources of CO2 emissions are the combustion of fossil
fuels for energy production and transportation. Therefore, it is clear that a successful climate
change mitigation strategy has to include a shift from carbon intensive to carbon neutral
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energy technologies in the long run. In this long-run perspective, however, the set of tech-
nologies is not constant, but changes over time. New technologies are invented and (partly)
replace formerly established technologies. Thus, a better understanding of the causes and
determinants for technological change are inevitable for the long-run solution of anthropo-
genic climate change.
Complimentary to such a long-run approach on climate change mitigation, is a short-run
point of view. In this perspective, the question of “burden sharing”, i.e., which country cuts
emissions of greenhouse gases by how much, dominates over the long-run aspects of stock
pollutant accumulation and technological change. A prime example for such a burden sharing
treaty is the Kyoto protocol (United Nations 1997). Therein, most industrialized countries
committed to reduce their CO2 emissions in the period from 2008–2012 by an average of 5%
compared to the emissions in 1990. As it is doubted that the Kyoto protocol target would have
a significant impact on mitigating global climate change (for a review and critical assessment
see, e.g., Böehringer 2003), some countries have even committed to more drastic emission
reductions. The German government, for example, adopted 1995 a CO2 reduction target of
25% by 2005, compared to the emissions in 1990.
In this paper, I focus on a time horizon, which lies between the short-run and the long-
run point of view. In such a medium-term perspective, a burden sharing treaty, such as the
Kyoto protocol, is already agreed on. Moreover, I assume that the time horizon of this treaty
is too short for technological change to occur, but long enough for the accumulation of
technology specific capital stocks of already known and available production techniques.
As a consequence, emission reductions have to be achieved by a structural change of the
economy, either by increasing energy efficiency and reducing energy intensive consumption
or by replacing fossil fuel-based energy techniques by already available alternative energy
producing techniques.
In particular, I analyze how an economy optimally complies with the introduction of
a binding emission constraint, which restricts the use of an established energy producing
technique. In accordance with a medium-term perspective, I do not consider explicitly the
long-run environmental damage caused by the stock accumulating property of greenhouse
gases, and I also abstract from technological change and growth. Yet, the economy has two
options to comply with the emission constraint. First, it can save energy by transferring
labor from the established energy technique to consumption good production. Second, the
established energy technique can be partly replaced by two already known and available
alternative energy producing techniques. Each of the two linear-limitational alternative tech-
niques combine labor and a specific capital good, which takes a certain time span to produce
(i.e., exhibits an investment lag) and which deteriorates at a certain rate. These two dynamic
characteristics, investment lag and deterioration rate, are considered to be different for the
two alternative techniques. In particular, I am interested in how the optimal transition toward
the new (medium-term) stationary state takes place, dependent on the dynamic characteristics
of the alternative energy producing techniques.
The economic literature has addressed both the long-run and the short-run perspective on
the mitigation of climate change. For the long-term perspective, the induced technological
change debate plays an important role. 1 The intertemporal nature of the climate change
problem is addressed either in an endogenous growth framework or in an integrated assess-
1 Other relevant, but more general issues in the case of the long-term perspective on climate change miti-
gation include accumulation of stock pollutants (e.g., Aaheim 1999; Falk and Mendelsohn 1993; Moslener
and Requate forthcoming), uncertainty and irreversibility (e.g., Gollier and Treich 2003; Kolstad 1996; Lange
2003; Newell and Pizer 2003; Ulph and Ulph 1997), and discounting and intergenerational equity (e.g., Karp
2005; Li and Löfgren 2000; Lind 1982; Chichilnisky 1996; Portney and Weyant 1999; Weitzman 1998).
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ment model by scenario simulation. In the mostly used bottom–up approaches, induced
technological change is studied by applying one representative aggregated production tech-
nology, which becomes more efficient and/or less polluting by technological change (e.g.,
Goulder and Mathai 2000; Nordhaus 2002; Newell et al. 1999). In the top–down approaches,
induced technological change also allows for structural change between a set of competing
technologies (e.g., Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan 2003; Goulder and Schneider 1999; Van der
zwaan et al. 2002). However, the impact of induced technological change on climate change
mitigation varies greatly among the different studies (e.g., Carraro et al.2003; Löeschel 2002;
Gerlagh and Lise 2005). Another approach to the analysis of induced technological change
explicitly allows for the strategic interaction between the regulator, an innovating R&D sec-
tor and firms which adopt new technology (e.g., Fisher et al. 2003; Laffont and Tirole 1996;
Montero 2002; Phaneuf and Requate 2002; Requate and Unold 2003; Requate forthcoming).
One strand of the literature, which addresses the short-run perspective, analyzes the effec-
tiveness of different policy instruments to reduce emissions, either in theoretical (e.g., Aidt
and Dutta 2004; Hoel and Karp 2000; Montero 2002; Pezzey 2003) or in computational
general equilibrium (CGE) models (e.g., Böehringer and Vogt 2003; Buonanno et al. 2003;
Dellink et al. 2004; Pizer 2002). Another strand of the literature considers strategic inter-
actions between different countries, which negotiate emission reductions (e.g., Endres and
Finus 1999, 2002; Rubio and Casino 2005; Yang 2003), or analyze optimal policy instru-
ments with strategic interactions between a regulator and individual firms (e.g., Gersbach
and Glazer 1999; Gersbach and Requate 2004; Moledina et al. 2003).
Despite this extensive literature on the long-run and the short-run perspective of climate
change mitigation, there is a lack of literature on the medium-term, where the agreement
on the burden sharing treaty is already achieved and has to be implemented by the set of
already existing energy saving options and alternative energy producing techniques. The aim
of this paper is to provide (to the very best of my knowledge) the first theoretical analysis of
this medium-term perspective on climate change mitigation and the corresponding choice of
techniques based on their dynamic characteristics.2
Therefore, I combine emission constraints with heterogeneous time-lagged capital the-
ory.3 I show that it might be optimal to utilize both techniques on the transition paths toward
the new stationary state, although, in general, only one of the two alternative techniques
prevails in the (medium-term) stationary state (and only if replacement is superior to energy
saving alone). Hence, while in a static economy only one technique is efficient, this is not
necessarily true in a dynamic economy. Although this paper is predominantly a theoretical
discussion of a specific problem (i.e., the optimal compliance with an emission target in a
medium-term perspective), the conclusions point toward a more general applicability, which
has to be explicitly investigated in future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The resulting inter-
temporal optimization problem and its necessary and sufficient conditions are discussed in
Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, the different stationary state equilibria are discussed, while Sect. 5 is
devoted to the optimal transition path. In Sect. 6, the underlying model assumptions are
critically reviewed and some policy implications are discussed. Sect. 7 concludes.
2 Therefore, my paper is somewhat related to Bhaduri (1968) and Nuti (1970), who also draw attention on
what I call dynamic characteristics, however, in a completely different context.
3 The time-lagged accumulation of capital is an idea which dates back to the Austrian school of economics
(von Böehm-Bawerk [1889]1921), and was revived by the neo-Austrian capital theory in the 1970s (e.g., von
Weizsäecker 1971; Hicks 1973; Faber 1979). Most recently, it has been discussed in the macroeconomics real
business cycle literature (e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1982; Ioannides and Taub 1992) and in the vintage capital
growth theory (e.g., Boucekkine et al. 2005; Feichtinger et al. 2006).
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2 The model
In this section, I introduce a simple dynamic model to analyze the optimal compliance of an
economy to an exogenously given emission target. For reasons of tractability, emphasis is
laid on a most simplistic model structure, which is still rich enough to capture the dynamics
of the medium-term perspective as outline in Sect. 1.
Consider an economy with a single primary input factor (e.g., labor) given in the constant
amount l¯ at all times, which is distributed among six production processes within three dif-
ferent production sectors: the energy sector, the consumption good sector, and the investment
sector.
The energy sector comprises three different energy producing techniques, represented by
three linear-limitational production processes. The rationale for using Leontief-type produc-
tion functions is (apart from tractability considerations) to account for rigidities in energy
production due to technical and thermodynamical constraints. However, for the sake of sim-
plicity, fuel inputs are not considered explicitly.
The first process, the status quo process in the economy, is considered to produce energy
solely by means of labor:4
x0(t) = l0(t). (1)
In addition, the first process is considered to jointly produce an unwanted and, at least
potentially, harmful pollutant. The emissions e are proportional to the amount of energy x0
produced:
e(t) = x0(t) = l0(t). (2)
From time t = 0 onward, a binding emission constraint is enacted to reduce the emissions e
of the pollutant jointly produced by the status quo energy producing technique:
x0(t) = l0(t) ≤ φ. (3)
Furthermore, the economy has access to two ‘clean’ energy producing techniques, which
do not jointly produce a pollutant. Each of these alternative processes utilizes a special cap-
ital good in a Leontief-type production function. Thus, one unit of energy is produced by
combining λh units of labor together with κh units of capital (h = 1, 2):
xh(t) = min
[
lh(t)
λh
,
kh(t)
κh
]
, h = 1, 2. (4)
For the remainder of the paper, I refer to the Energy Producing Techniques (1) and (4) as
EPT0, EPT1, and EPT2.
Energy is considered to be homogeneous and non-storable. As a consequence, the total
energy x available at time t equals:
x(t) = x0(t) + x1(t) + x2(t). (5)
The specific capital goods kh necessary to produce energy via EPTh(h = 1, 2), are produced
in the investment sector. For the sake of simplicity, the production of the specific capital goods
4 Neglecting capital in the status quo technology is justified because of two reasons. First, the status quo tech-
nique is assumed to be fully developed at the beginning of the time horizon. Second, as capital is considered
to be specific to the different production processes, it cannot be moved from the status quo to the alternative
techniques. Hence, capital in the status quo technique need not to be considered explicitly, as there is no inertia
from building up the capital stock and the capital stock is sunk, once it cannot be fully employed anymore.
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is assumed to take the following form: one unit of labor input equals one unit of investment
in the specific capital goods.
ih(t) = lh+2(t), h = 1, 2. (6)
However, the investment ih is considered to take the time span σh until it turns into produc-
tive capital kh(h = 1, 2). Furthermore, the capital goods kh deteriorate at the constant and
positive rates γh . Hence, the equations of motion for the two capital stocks read:
k˙h(t) = ih(t−σh) − γhkh(t), h = 1, 2. (7)
The intuition behind these assumptions is that energy plants are not built in a day. In fact,
energy plants need considerable time to build. Moreover, both the time to built and the dete-
rioration rate are technology specific and vary greatly among different energy technologies.
Hence, each alternative energy producing technique is characterized by two dynamic char-
acteristics: the investment period σh and the deterioration rate γh (h = 1, 2). Without loss of
generality, I assume σ1 < σ2.
The consumption good sector comprises one aggregated Cobb–Douglas production func-
tion, which allows for the substitution between labor l and energy x :
c(t) = F(l(t), x(t)) = l(t)αx(t)1−α, 0 > α > 1. (8)
The intuition behind the choice of a Cobb–Douglas production function for the consump-
tion good, while the energy producing techniques are linear-limitational, is twofold. First,
in the model the consumption good sector is more aggregated than the energy sector, as
it is only represented by one production technique, compared to three energy producing
techniques. Thus, if one considers an internal structure of the consumption good sector,
there is the possibility of substituting labor and energy by employing different ratios of the
microeconomic production techniques. Second, while energy is a homogeneous commodity,
consumption is not. Thus, society can substitute energy by labor, by producing less energy
intensive consumption goods.
At the beginning of the time horizon, EPT0 is considered to be the status quo in the econ-
omy. Hence, the economy has not utilized the two alternative energy producing technologies
in the past. Note that the economy has two options how to comply with the emission constraint
φ. The labor, freed from EPT0 due to the emission constraint, can either be used to produce
energy by the clean techniques EPT1 and EPT2, or energy can be saved by employing the
surplus labor directly in the consumption good process (8).
In order to decide how to comply with the emission constraint, society seeks to maximize
the intertemporal welfare functional W of a representative consumer
W {c(t)} =
∫ ∞
0
V (c(t)) exp[−ρt] dt, (9)
where V is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave instantaneous
welfare function (Vc > 0, Vcc < 0), depending solely on consumption c, and ρ is the constant
and positive discount rate. Thus, emissions do not directly influence welfare, and environ-
mental concerns are solely reflected by the introduction of the emission constraint. This is
justified, if costs of environmental protection occur today, while benefits occur in the distant
future and/or are uncertain and, therefore, difficult to quantify.5
5 In the terminology of Winkler (2005), this approach represents the ecological solution to incorporate joint
production in welfare analysis.
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In the following, I analyze whether and, if so, which of the two alternative energy
producing techniques, EPT1 and EPT2, partly replaces the status quo technique, in order to
comply with the emission constraint φ. Moreover, I am interested not only in the (medium-
term) stationary state, but also in the transition dynamics. Obviously, both of these hinge, in
general, upon the functional form of the instantaneous welfare function V , the exogenously
given parameters α, λ1, λ2, κ1, κ2, ρ, and φ, and especially upon the dynamic characteristics
σ1, σ2, γ1, and γ2 of the two alternative techniques.
3 The intertemporal optimization problem
As welfare is strictly increasing in consumption, and consumption good production can
always be increased by assigning more labor to the consumption good process (8), the labor
restriction will hold with equality along the optimal path:
l(t) = l¯ − l0(t) − l1(t) − l2(t) − l3(t) − l4(t). (10)
Assuming efficient production of EPT1 and EPT2, i.e., lh(t)/λh = kh(t)/κh (h = 1, 2), and
inserting Eq. 6 into the labor restriction (10), yields:
l(t) = l¯ − l0(t) − λ1
κ1
k1(t) − λ2
κ2
k2(t) − ii (t) − i2(t). (11)
Analogously, by inserting Eqs. 1 and 4 into Eq. 5, one derives for total energy production x :
x(t) = l0(t) + k1(t)
κ1
+ k2(t)
κ2
. (12)
Hence, consumption c is a function of the control variables l0, i1, and i2, and the stock
variables k1 and k2:
c(t) = F(l(t), x(t)) =
[
l¯ − l0(t) − λ1
κ1
k1(t) − λ2
κ2
k2(t) − i1(t) − i2(t)
]α
×
[
l0(t) + k1(t)
κ1
+ k2(t)
κ2
]1−α
. (13)
Assuming that investment is non-negative, i.e., the capital stocks cannot be consumed, the
intertemporal optimization problem, society seeks to solve, reads:
max
l0,i1,i2
∫ ∞
0
V (c(t)) exp[−ρt] dt (14a)
subject to
c(t) = F(l(t), x(t)), (14b)
k˙h(t) = ih(t−σh) − γhkh(t), h = 1, 2, (14c)
ih(t) ≥ 0, h = 1, 2, (14d)
φ ≥ l0(t), (14e)
ih(t) = ξh(t) = 0, t ∈ [−σh, 0), h = 1, 2, (14f)
kh(0) = 0, h = 1, 2. (14g)
Because of the positive time-lags σh (h = 1, 2), the equations of motion for the capital
stocks kh become retarded differential-difference equations. Thus, variations in the capital
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stock kh not only depend on parameters evaluated at time t , but also on parameters evaluated
at the earlier time t −σh . As a consequence, and in contrast to instantaneous accumulation
models, the specification of an initial value kh(0) for the capital stock kh is not sufficient
for a unique solution. In addition, an initial path ξh for the investment ih in the time interval
[−σh, 0) has to be specified. The path of the capital stock kh in the time interval t ∈ [0, σh] is
completely determined by the initial capital stock kh(0), the initial path ξh , and the retarded
equation of motion. Thus, time-lagged accumulation models exhibit an additional moment
of inertia, as the capital stocks react with a delay to variations in investment.
3.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions of the optimal solution
To solve the resulting optimization problem, I apply the generalized maximum principle
derived in El-Hodiri et al. (1972) for time-lagged optimal control problems. One obtains the
following present-value Hamiltonian H
H = V (c(t)) exp[−ρt] + pc(t)[F(l(t), x(t)) − c(t)]
+pk1(t+σ1)i1(t) − pk1(t)γ1k1(t) + pk2(t+σ2)i2(t) − pk2(t)γ2k2(t)
+pi1(t)i1(t) + pi2(t)i2(t) + pφ(t)[φ − l0(t)], (15)
where pc, pi1 , pi2 , and pφ denote the Kuhn–Tucker parameters for the corresponding con-
straints, and pk1 and pk2 are the costate variables for the capital stocks k1 and k2. The differ-
ence from instantaneous capital accumulation models is covered by the term pkh (t+σh)ih(t)
(h = 1, 2).6
Assuming that the Hamiltonian H is continuously differentiable with respect to ih (h =
1, 2), the following necessary conditions hold for an optimal solution (partial derivatives of
the functions H, V , and F are indicated by subscripts and only the time argument is stated
explicitly):
Hc = Vc(t) exp[−ρt] − pc(t) = 0, (16a)
Hl0 = pc(t) [Fx (t) − Fl(t)] − pφ(t) = 0, (16b)
Hih = −pc(t)Fl(t) + pkh (t+σh) + pih (t) = 0, h = 1, 2, (16c)
Hkh = pc(t)
[
1
κh
Fx (t) − λh
κh
Fl(t)
]
− γh pkh (t) = − p˙kh (t), h = 1, 2, (16d)
pih (t) ≥ 0, pih (t)ih(t) = 0, h = 1, 2, (16e)
pφ(t) ≥ 0, pφ(t)[φ − l0(t)] = 0. (16f)
Due to the concavity of the Hamiltonian H, the necessary conditions are also sufficient, if,
in addition, the following transversality conditions hold:
lim
t→∞ pkh (t)kh(t) = 0, h = 1, 2. (16g)
The economic interpretation of the necessary and sufficient conditions is straightforward.
Condition (16a) says that, along the optimal path, the shadow price of the consumption good
equals the marginal utility of consumption. According to conditions (16b) and (16f), pφ = 0
and Fx equals Fl , if the emission constraint is not binding. In this case, society is indifferent,
6 Although it might look odd at first sight to have pkh (h = 1, 2) evaluated at a future time, while there are
retarded equations of motion (14c), the explanation is quite intuitive: pkh measures the net present value of
all future welfare gains of one additional unit of capital kh . As investment takes the time period σh to turn
into productive capital, the investment ih(t) gives rise to additional capital kh at t +σh , the net present value
of which is given by pkh (t+σh).
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whether to apply one additional marginal unit of labor directly to the consumption good
process, or use it to produce an additional marginal unit of energy, which is then applied
in the consumption good process. If the emission constraint is binding, pφ is non-negative
and measures the welfare gain society would be able to achieve, by taking one marginal unit
of labor from the consumption good process (8) and apply it to the production of energy in
EPT0.
Together with the transversality conditions (16g), conditions (16d) can be unambiguously
solved to yield:
pkh (t) =
∫ ∞
t
pc(t ′)
[
1
κh
Fx (t ′) − λh
κh
Fl(t ′)
]
exp[−γh(t ′ − t)] dt ′, h = 1, 2. (17)
Hence, in the optimum the shadow prices for the capital stocks equal the net present value of
all future welfare gains of one additional marginal unit of the corresponding capital good. As
capital goods are long lived, they contribute over the whole time horizon, although, increas-
ingly less due to deterioration. The term in square brackets gives the marginal productivity
of an additional unit of labor. On the one hand, an additional unit of capital drains labor from
the consumption good process, in order to be employed. On the other hand, the capital good
produces additional energy, which increases consumption good production.
The remaining conditions, (16c) and (16e), imply that, as long as pih = 0 and, thus,
ih ≥ 0 (h = 1, 2), the welfare loss of the investment of an additional marginal unit has
to equal the net present value of the future welfare gains of an additional marginal unit of
capital. As investment needs time to turn into productive capital, the shadow prices of capital
are evaluated at the future time t + σh .
For an investment in both alternative energy producing techniques to be optimal over the
whole time horizon, pi1 = 0 and pi2 = 0 have to hold for all t . According to the condi-
tions (16c) this is equivalent to pk1(t + σ1) = pk2(t + σ2) for all t . This also implies that
p˙k1(t + σ1) = p˙k2(t + σ2) for all t . Hence, equating (16d) for h = 1, and h = 2 yields:
κ2 exp[ρσ2]
κ1 exp[ρσ1] =
Vc(t+σ2)
[
Fx (t+σ2) − (λ2 + κ2γ2)Fl(t+σ2)
]
Vc(t+σ1)
[
Fx (t+σ1) − (λ1 + κ1γ1)Fl(t+σ1)
] . (18)
As c(t), l(t), and x(t) change over time, and V is a generic function, this equation can only
hold accidentally for all t . Thus, in general, only one of the two alternative energy producing
techniques will partly replace the status quo technique in the (medium-term) stationary state.
3.2 Restrictions on exogenous parameters
I further structure the optimization problem (14) by imposing the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 (binding emission constraint) The emission constraint is binding, i.e., the
emission constraint is smaller than the emissions would be without an emission constraint.
Assumption 2 (inefficiency of alternative techniques) Society evaluates the alternative
techniques to be inferior compared to the status quo technique, if the emissions are not
taken into account, i.e., it is not optimal to replace EPT0 by EPT1 and/or EPT2 without the
enactment of a binding emission constraint.
These assumptions impose restrictions on the exogenously given parameters. As shown
in the appendix, Assumption 1 implies that
φ ∈ [0, e	), e	 = (1 − α)l¯. (19)
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Thus, it is convenient to express the emission constraint as a fraction ψ of the status quo
emissions:
φ = ψe	, ψ ∈ (0, 1). (20)
For Assumption 2 to hold the following inequalities have to hold simultaneously (proof in
the appendix):
1 ≤ λh + κh(ρ + γh) exp[ρσh], h = 1, 2. (21)
The conditions (21) say that, if the welfare costs (measured in units of labor) of the production
of one unit of energy are smaller for EPT0 (left-hand-side) than for the alternative techniques
EPTh (right-hand-side of conditions (21)), then EPTh will not be used without a binding
emission constraint (h = 1, 2).
The optimization problem (14) cannot be solved analytically. Thus, the straightforward
approach, to solve the optimization problem in order to determine the optimal transition path,
is not applicable. However, it is possible to analytically derive the (medium-term) stationary
state and some qualitative properties of the optimal solution.
4 Stationary state equilibria
Although conditions (20) and (21) restrict the possible outcomes of the optimization problem
(14), there are still two qualitatively different stationary state equilibria for the economy. (1)
EPT1 and EPT2 can be so inferior compared to EPT0 that it is optimal to use the labor, which
cannot be employed anymore in EPT0 because of the binding emission constraint, directly in
the consumption good process (8) instead of utilizing EPT1 or EPT2. (2) At least one of the
two alternative techniques is so efficient that its use is optimal in the presence of a binding
emission constraint. Then, EPT0 is partly replaced by EPT1 and/or EPT2.
4.1 Optimal compliance by energy saving alone
In the first case, the binding emission constraint is reached by energy saving alone. The
conditions for the exogenously given parameters for energy saving alone to be optimal are
given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (energy saving only) Given the optimization problem (14) and a binding emis-
sion constraint (20), it is optimal to employ all labor, which is freed by the binding emission
constraint φ, in the consumption good process (8) and neither utilize EPT1 or EPT2, if the
following condition holds simultaneously for h = 1 and h = 2:
1 + 1 − ψ
αψ
≤ λh + κh(ρ + γh) exp[ρσh], h = 1, 2. (22)
Proof In the appendix.
If inequality (22) holds simultaneously for h = 1, and h = 2, society will not invest in
either of the two alternative energy producing technologies and remain in the stationary state
given by (A.4). In this case, the emission constraint is reached by energy saving alone, i.e.,
the labor freed from EPT0 is directly used in the consumption good process (8).
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4.2 Optimal compliance by replacement of energy techniques
If at least one of the inequalities (22) is violated, energy saving alone, in order to comply
with the emission constraint, is not optimal. In fact, society will invest at least in one of
the alternative techniques EPT1 or EPT2. As a consequence, the economy will not stay in
a stationary state, as in the case of energy saving alone, but follow a dynamic transition
path toward a new stationary state, where the status quo technique EPT0 is partly replaced
by EPT1 or EPT2. In general, only one of the two alternative energy producing techniques,
EPT1 or EPT2, prevails in this new stationary state, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 2 (replacement of energy techniques) Given the optimization problem (14), a
binding emission constraint (20) and further assuming that condition (22) is violated for
both h = 1, and h = 2, the alternative energy producing technique with the lower unit costs
of energy prevails in the stationary state, i.e., λh +κh(ρ+γh) exp[ρσh] (h = 1, 2). Assuming
that EPTh (h = 1, 2) has the lower unit costs of energy, the stationary state is given by the
following equations:
l	0 = l¯(1 − α)ψ,
i	h = l¯(1 − α)γhκh Ah,
k	h = l¯(1 − α)κh Ah,
l	 = l¯{1 − (1 − α)[ψ + (λh + κhγh)Ah]}, (23)
x	 = l¯(1 − α)(ψ + Ah),
c	 = l¯{1 − (1 − α)[ψ + (λh + κhγh)Ah]}α{(1 − α)(ψ + Ah)}1−α
with Ah = 1 − ψ
{
1 − α[1 − λh − κh(ρ + γh) exp[−ρσh]]}
λh + κh {(1 − α)γh + α(ρ + γh) exp[ρσh]} .
In addition, the stationary state is a saddle point.
Proof In the appendix.
Although only one of the two alternative energy producing techniques prevails in the sta-
tionary state in general, this is not necessarily true, if EPT1 and EPT2 have the same unit costs
of energy, i.e., λ1 +κ1(ρ+γ1) exp[ρσ1] = λ2 +κ2(ρ+γ2) exp[ρσ2]. In this case, the society
is indifferent in the optimal stationary state between EPT1 and EPT2, and the stationary state
is no longer unique. As this only holds for very specific values of the exogenously given
parameters, it is not further addressed in the following.
5 Transition dynamics
Although Proposition 2 shows that in the (medium-term) stationary state only one alterna-
tive energy producing technique prevails, this does not tell much about the transition path. In
fact, it might be optimal to utilize both alternative energy producing techniques for some time
along the optimal transition path. In the following, this is shown with a numerical example,
as the transition paths cannot be analyzed analytically. Note that the parameter values used
for the numerical optimization have been primarily chosen such, as to illustrate clearly the
different effects, and, therefore, do not necessarily reflect the characteristics of real energy
technology transitions.
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Figure 1 shows typical numerical optimization results for two scenarios. In the first
scenario, EPT1 prevails in the stationary state (left side of Fig. 1), in the second scenario,
EPT2 prevails in the stationary state (right side of Fig. 1).7 The exogenous parameters and
the functional form of the instantaneous welfare function V are given in Table 1. They are
such that, without an emission constraint, 0.5 units of labor are employed in EPT0 to pro-
duce energy and 0.5 units of labor are directly employed in the consumption good process
(8), to yield a constant consumption output of 0.5 units. Furthermore, given the exogenous
parameters, energy saving alone under the binding emission constraint ψ is optimal, if the
unit costs of energy for both EPT1 and EPT2 exceed 3. To illustrate the effect of different
dynamic characteristics, EPT1 and EPT2 exhibit identical λh and κh (h = 1, 2) and differ
only in σh and γh . The investment lag for EPT2 is considered to be twice as long as for
EPT1.
Note that the optimal paths exhibit oscillatory behavior, which is increasingly damped
and finally converges toward the stationary state values. Although quite uncommon in
simple capital accumulation models, oscillatory optimal paths are a general feature of time-
lagged optimal control problems, as shown in Appendix A.4. In the beginning,
consumption drops drastically, as energy production via EPT0 is restricted by the emis-
sion constraint and a considerable amount of labor is bound to be invested in the alternative
energy techniques. In the stationary state, consumption consolidates at a level of 0.488, com-
pared to 0.5 before the emission constraint became effective. Total energy output is below,
and labor used in the consumption good process (8) is higher than in the original stationary
state.
The most notable characteristic of these scenarios, however, is that it can be optimal to
utilize both alternative techniques along the optimal path. In the case that EPT1 prevails in
the stationary state, the deterioration rates have been set to γ1 = 0.1 and γ2 = 0.15, implying
unit costs of energy equal to 1.158 for EPT1, and 1.221 for EPT2. Hence, as both unit costs of
energy are below the threshold 3, where energy saving alone would be optimal, investment in
both alternative energy producing techniques cannot be ruled out by Proposition 1. However,
as EPT1, the energy producing technique with the smaller investment lag, prevails in the
stationary state, EPT2 is never utilized over the whole time horizon.
The situation is different in the second scenario, where EPT2 prevails in the stationary
state. Here, the deterioration rates have been set to γ1 = 0.15 and γ2 = 0.1, implying
unit costs of energy equal to 1.210 for EPT1, and 1.166 for EPT2. Although EPT2 pre-
vails in the stationary state, EPT1 is utilized in the beginning. This asymmetry is quite
intuitive: although EPT2 exhibits lower unit costs in the stationary state, EPT1 has the
advantage of a shorter investment lag. Thus, in the short run, EPT1 can (at least partly)
bridge the gap between the investment and the emergence of capital for EPT2. Obviously,
this is not possible the other way round. When EPT1 exhibits lower unit costs in the sta-
tionary state, it is also advantageous in the short run, due to its shorter investment lag.
However, this is not necessarily true for other economic contexts. In the second scenario,
EPT2 exhibits a smaller deterioration rate and, thus, its capital stock lasts longer. If, for
example, a finite instead of an infinite time horizon is considered, this dynamic character-
istic of higher durability would make EPT2 preferable over EPT1 at the end of the time
horizon.
7 The numerical optimizations were derived with the advanced optimal control software package MUSCOD-
II (Diehl et al. 2001), which exploits the multiple shooting state discretization (Leineweber et al. 2003). To
apply MUSCOD-II to time-lagged optimal control problems, the optimization problem has to be reformulated
as described in Winkler et al. (2004).
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Fig. 1 Two typical optimal paths for the case that EPT1 (left) and EPT2 (right) prevails in the stationary state.
Optimal paths are shown for consumption, total energy supply x and labor l employed in the consumption
good process (top), investment and capital stock of EPT1 (middle), and investment and capital stock of EPT2
(bottom)
Table 1 Exogenous parameter values for the numerical optimization
ρ α ψ κ1 κ2 λ1 λ2 σ1 σ2 l¯ V (c(t))
0.05 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ln(c(t))
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6 Discussion
The main result of the model set up in this paper is that the choice of technique, while trivial
in the short-run point of view of a static economy, and mainly determined by technological
change in the long run, gains particular importance in the medium-term perspective, where
the time horizon is too short for technological change to occur, but long enough for spe-
cific capital stocks to build up and to deteriorate. It is shown that along the optimal path,
and depending on the dynamic characteristics, production technologies are used during the
transition period, although they are inferior in the stationary state. In the following, I briefly
discuss the robustness of this result in accordance to the model assumptions and hint at
resulting policy implications.
6.1 Model assumptions
The driving denominators for the result are the dynamic characteristics. For the sake of
simplicity, I only consider two straight forward dynamic characteristics in the model, the
time-lag σ and the deterioration rate γ . They determine the two time scales on which capital
builds up and declines, respectively. While the deterioration rate is a standard assumption in
models including capital, the investment lag is rather a specialty. However, its consideration
is straightforward, as energy plant construction exhibits both considerably long and strongly
varying construction periods, depending on the type of the plant. According to IEA (2005),
the construction time for gas fired plants range between 2 and 3 years, most coal fired plants
are set up within 4 years and nuclear power plants need 5–10 years to build. Most renewable
power generation plants are of considerably smaller size and exhibit construction periods of
less than 2 years. Exceptions are macro hydroelectric power plants such as the Three Gorges
Dam Project in China, which has a scheduled construction period of 17 years. Also the costs
per kWh vary drastically among the different energy producing techniques. According to the
same study (IEA 2005), the costs per kWh range between 2.5 and 6 USD cent for coal fired
plants, between 3.7 and 6.3 USD cent for gas fired plants and between 2.1 and 5 USD cent for
nuclear power plants. Among the renewable energies, wind energy exhibits costs per kWh
between 3.5 and 14 USD cent and micro-scale hydro power plants range between 4 and 10
USD cent per kWh. Solar power is most expensive implying costs per kWh ranging between
at least 15 USD cent up to considerably beyond 30 USD cent.
The linear-limitational form of the energy technologies is a crucial assumption for the
results. The linearity assures that production techniques might not be used at all, as their unit
costs (in terms of labor), which are independent of the output level, are too high. Obviously,
this could not happen, if all technologies satisfy Inada conditions and, thus, would always
be utilized (although, possibly on very low levels). As already pointed out in Sect. 2, the
linear-limitational form accounts better for the technical and thermodynamical rigidities in
energy production compared to a Cobb–Douglas or CES function.
Note, however, that it may be optimal to utilize both techniques does not depend on an
unanticipated emission constraint. Even if society knows in advance that a binding emission
target will be enacted in the future, the qualitative result that both alternative techniques may
be utilized along the optimal transition path, is robust as shown in Winkler (2003, Chap. 7).
The intuition is that, even if society knows about the emission constraint in advance, it is
suboptimal to start investing in the alternative techniques too early, as they are inefficient
compared to the status quo technique, as long as the emission constraint is not enacted. In
summary, the model result does not (at least qualitatively) depend on the specific assumption
of a binding emission target, which is enacted without lead-in time. Moreover, as already
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pointed out in the introduction, the case of an emission target is of particular relevance in the
medium-term perspective of climate change mitigation.
From a more technical perspective, the time-to-build feature is responsible for the oscil-
latory behavior of the optimal paths (see Fig. 1). It is worth noting that this is a general
characteristic of functional differential equations and is not an artifact of specific model
assumptions such as the liner-limitational form of the production functions or a binding and
unanticipated emission constraint.8 However, both the amplitude and the persistence of these
oscillations depend on the explicit model setup and the values of the exogenous parameters.9
Thus, one has to be cautious about the empirical relevance of the oscillatory behavior. In
particular, this holds as the simple model used in this paper allows for costless shift of labor
between the different sectors, which is a very optimistic assumption about labor mobility.
For the sake of a tractable model, I abstract from a series of peculiarities of the econom-
ics of the energy industry. First, energy technologies differ in more dynamic characteristics
than just the construction period and the deterioration rate. As an example, think of different
turn-on/turn-off costs and rigidities, which play an important role for the choice (or the mix)
of techniques, as the energy industry exhibits oscillatory demand fluctuations on different
time scales, such as day/night time and summer/winter (e.g., hydroelectric power and gas
cogeneration plants can easily be turned on and switched off and are, therefore, well suited
to supply energy for peak demands, while nuclear power plants are extremely costly and
time-consuming to load adjustments and, thus, are preferably used to supply the base load).
Second, the energy industry exhibits an oligopolistic market structure. As is well known
from the industrial organization literature, unregulated oligopolistic market regimes lead in
general to market failures in the sense that the market outcome is not a social optimum.
Thus, the social optimum, as derived in this model, cannot simply be implemented by a
decentralized unregulated market regime. In this paper, I abstract from these market failures
to concentrate on the optimal choice of technique.
6.2 Policy implications
Although the results stem from a highly stylized theoretical model, there are some direct and
indirect policy conclusions to be drawn. First, the direct policy implication, concerning opti-
mal compliance with emission constraints, is straightforward. Although one technique has
the smallest unit costs of energy and, thus, is the prime candidate to replace the established
and polluting technique, it might be beneficial to look also at energy techniques with higher
unit costs of energy, as they might have favorable dynamic characteristics, which can help
to smoothen the transition path. Hence, the explicit consideration of the different dynamic
characteristic offers additional cost-saving potential for the transition toward a less polluting
energy industry in the medium-term perspective.
Second, in light of the model results, policies which subsidize clean energy technolo-
gies, such as the German “Erneuerbare–Energien–Gesetz” (Renewable Energy Act), have
to be reconsidered according to their economic efficiency. The Renewable Energy Act was
first enacted in April 2000 and amended in August 2004. The stated purpose of the act is
to increase the share of renewable energy technologies to at least 12.5% in 2020 and 20%
in 2020. Moreover, the act aims at a sustainable provision of energy, a reduction of inse-
cure markets for fossil fuels and a promotion of technological progress in renewable energy
8 See, for example, Winkler (2004) for a model with non-linear production function and explicit economic
valuation of the trade-off between utility derived from consumption versus the disutility stemming from stock
pollution.
9 Winkler et al. (2005) investigate the dependence between oscillatory behavior and the size of the time-lag.
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technology.10 Thus, the renewable energy act plays an important role in the endeavor to
comply with the CO2 emissions reduction target of 25%. On the one hand, the model results
give additional support for the act, as renewable energy technologies exhibit, in general,
higher unit costs but smaller construction periods than fossil fuel based or nuclear power
plants and, thus, are potential candidates for smoothing transition paths in the medium-term
perspective. On the other hand, if unit costs are above a certain threshold, energy saving is the
cost-efficient method to comply. In fact, at least from a medium-term perspective, which does
not take into account dynamic effects like learning curves or induced technological change,
the very high subsidies for photovoltaics (45.7–62.4 EUR cent per kWh compared to 5.5–9.1
EUR cent per kWh for wind energy and 7.16–15 EUR cent per kWh for geothermal energy)
raise doubts about their efficient use in Germany.
Third, the results are not restricted to the special context of emission constraints in the
context of climate change mitigation. Every kind of institutional change creates a shock,
which alters the economic context. Thus, established techniques may be less favorable after-
wards and techniques, which were inefficient before, may now be potential candidates to
replace the established techniques, either because they are now the most efficient technique
(i.e., the technique with the lowest unit costs) or because they have favorable dynamic char-
acteristics for smoothing the transition path. Thus, the medium-term perspective introduced
in this paper, which is too short for technological change to occur, but long enough for capital
stocks to build up and deteriorate, might provide a useful framework to identify additional
cost-saving potential for a variety of different contexts.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, I have analyzed, how an economy optimally complies to a binding emission
constraint that restricts the use of a established energy technique. I have shown that energy
saving alone is optimal only if both alternative techniques exhibit unit costs of energy over
a certain threshold. Otherwise, the alternative energy technique with the lower unit costs of
energy will prevail in the stationary state. On the transition path, however, it may be beneficial
for the society to utilize both techniques.
These results imply that the medium-term perspective taken in this paper may offer addi-
tional cost-saving potential by utilizing techniques during the transition period, although they
are not optimal in the (medium-term) stationary state. In the context of binding emission con-
straints to mitigate anthropogenic climate change, this implies that the unit costs of energy
should not be the prime determinant in the political discussion for the choice of technique, but
other dynamic characteristics, such as the construction period, the lifetime, etc., have to be
taken into account. However, the model presented here does only consider the medium-term
perspective. For a successful mitigation policy, all three time scales have to be taken into
account. In particular, this implies an endogenous emission target and explicit consideration
of learning curves and induced technological change.
Nevertheless, the first (international) agreements on CO2 emission reductions are enacted,
and the compliance with these targets is a task that many industrialized countries face today.
The results of the model constitute a theoretical underpinning to evaluate the economic
efficiency of policies, which aim to reduce emissions in order to comply with a specific
reduction target, such as the German Renewable Energy Act. Even if some renewable energy
10 According to the act, suppliers of renewable energy get unit subsidies which depend on the energy tech-
nology and the size of the plant. Moreover, the subsidies are decreasing over time, to give incentives for
productivity increases. The subsidy rates are adjusted regularly (last adjustment in August 2004).
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technologies might not be the optimal choice in the long run, they might still be favorable
along the transition path. However, if and to what extend subsidies for different energy tech-
nologies are ‘economically justified’ has to be scrutinized by further empirical research,
which also takes into account the specific peculiarities of the energy industry.
Although this paper was explicitly framed to analyze the compliance with binding emission
targets in the context of mitigating climate change, the results point to broader implications.
So far I have only considered a foreseeable shock as a result of a deliberate policy action.
However, we live in an unpredictable world. My results suggest that we are better prepared
for unforeseeable shocks the more different techniques, with all kinds of different dynamic
characteristics, we have available. The situation is comparable to agriculture, where it is well
known that monocultures might yield the highest harvest, but crop combinations reduce the
systems sensitivity to exogenous shocks, such as drought, flooding or epidemics. Hence, a
bundle of techniques, with a high diversity of dynamic characteristics, can act as an insur-
ance against unforeseeable exogenous shocks, a notion briefly mentioned in Baumgärtner
and Schiller (2001). This constitutes another fruitful direction for future research.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of condition (19)
In the status quo stationary state, the labor restriction reduces to l = l¯ − l0 and total energy
production equals x = x0 = l0. Utilizing condition (16b) that Fl = Fx , if the emission target
is not binding, leads to the following values for the stationary state without binding emission
target:
l	 = αl¯,
l	0 = x	 = e	 = (1 − α)l¯, (A.1)
c	 = αα(1 − α)1−α l¯.
Thus, to be binding, φ < e	.
A.2 Proof of Condition (21)
Assume that the emission target (3) is not binding and that the utilization of EPT0 alone is
optimal. Then the economy stays in the status quo stationary state given by (A.1). Utilizing
that Fx = Fl , if the emission target is not binding, one obtains for the shadow prices of
capital (17):
pkh (t) =
1 − λ
κh(ρ + γh) Vc(c
	)Fl(l	, x	) exp[−ρt], h = 1, 2. (A.2)
Furthermore, ih = 0 and, according to conditions (16e), pih ≥ 0 (h = 1, 2). Then, inserting
(16a) and (A.2) in conditions (16c) yields:
Vc(c	)Fl(l	, x	) exp[−ρt] ≥ 1 − λ
κh(ρ + γh) Vc(c
	)Fl(l	, x	) exp[−ρ(t+σh)], h=1, 2 .
(A.3)
Note that this condition is invariant over time, i.e., is the same for all t . This is true, as in a
stationary state both the welfare loss due to a marginal investment in capital and the welfare
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gain due to the future utilization of the capital good are constant over time. Dividing both sides
by Vc(c	)Fl(l	, x	) exp[−ρt] and re-arranging the inequality leads to the conditions (21).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a binding emission target (20) and that it is not optimal to invest in either of the
two alternative energy producing technologies for all t . Then, the labor restriction reduces to
l(t) = l¯ − l0(t). Furthermore, the usage of EPT0 is determined by the emission target and,
thus, the economy stays in the following stationary state:
lˆ = [1−ψ(1−α)]l¯,
lˆ0 = xˆ = eˆ = ψ(1−α)l¯,
cˆ = [1−ψ(1−α)]α[ψ(1−α)]1−α l¯. (A.4)
Following the same line of argument as in appendix A.2, this is only optimal if:
Vc(cˆ)Fl(lˆ, xˆ) exp[−ρt] ≥ Fx (lˆ, xˆ) − λh Fl(lˆ, xˆ)
κh(ρ + γh) Vc(cˆ) exp[−ρ(t + σh)], h = 1, 2.
(A.5)
Dividing both sides by Vc(cˆ)Fl(lˆ, xˆ) exp[−ρt], inserting lˆ and xˆ from (A.4) and re-arranging
the inequality, leads to the conditions (22).
A.4 Proof of proposition 2
In the stationary state equations (16c) yield after inserting Eq. (16a):
Vc(c	)Fl(l	, x	) exp[−ρt] = pk1(t + σ1) + pi1(t) = pk2(t + σ2) + pi2(t). (A.6)
Solving Eq. (17) for the stationary state, and inserting in Eq. (A.6), one obtains:
F	l =
Fx (l	, x	) − λ1 Fx (l	, x	)
κ1(ρ + γ1) exp[ρσ1] + pi1(t) =
Fx (l	, x	) − λ2 Fx (l	, x	)
κ2(ρ + γ2) exp[ρσ2] + pi2(t). (A.7)
Assuming that either pi1(t) = 0 or pi2(t) = 0 (which has to be the case, as conditions (22)
are violated and, thus, energy saving alone is not optimal) one can show that:
pih (t) > 0 ⇔ λh + κh(ρ + γh) exp[ρσh] > λ j + κ j (ρ + γ j ) exp[ρσ j ],
h, j = 1, 2, h = j. (A.8)
Thus, in the optimal stationary state, only the alternative energy producing technique is
utilized, which has the lower unit costs of energy.
In order to obtain the stationary state values for the control and stock variables, assume
that EPTh prevails, i.e., pih (t) = 0. Then, Eq. (A.6) together with the equation of motion
(14c) build a system of two (implicit) equations for the control variable ih and the stock
variable kh :
Fx (l	, x	)
Fl(l	, x	)
= λh + κh(ρ + γh) exp[ρσh], (A.9)
k	h = γhi	h . (A.10)
Solving these equations yields (23).
To determine the stability properties of the stationary state, I analyze the system dynamics
of the optimization problem (14). As there is only investment in one of the two alternative
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energy producing techniques in the stationary state, the optimization problem (14) reduces
to a optimal control problem with only one control and one stock variable in a neighborhood
around the stationary state (as l0 is completely determined by the emission target and either
i1 = k1 ≡ 0 or i2 = k2 ≡ 0, depending on which of the two alternative energy producing
techniques has the lower unit costs of energy). Assuming that EPTh prevails in the stationary
state, the system dynamics in a neighborhood around the stationary state is fully represented
by the following system of differential equations, which can be derived by the necessary and
sufficient conditions:11
i˙h(t) = Vc(t+σh)[Fx (t+σh) − λh Fl(t+σh)] exp[−ρσ ] − Vc(t)Fl(t)κh(γ + ρ)
κh[Vcc(t)Fl(t)2 + Vc(t)Fll(t)]
(A.11)
+ Vcc(t)Fl(t)[λh Fl(t) − Fx (t)] + Vc(t)[λh Fll(t) − Flx (t)]
κh[Vcc(t)Fl(t)2 + Vc(t)Fll(t)] [γhkh(t) − ih(t−σh)],
k˙h(t) = ih(t−σh) − γhkh(t). (A.12)
As i˙ and k˙ also depend on advanced (i.e., at a later time) and on retarded (i.e., at an earlier
time) variables, Eqs. (A.11) and (A.12) form a system of functional differential equations.12
Although this system is not analytically soluble in general (not even in the linear approxima-
tion around the stationary state), the stationary state (23) is in general saddle point stable.13
To see this, I introduce the following abbreviations (for the sake of a more convenient pre-
sentation, I drop the subscript h):
Vi (t) = −Vc(t)Fl(t),
Vk(t) = Vc(t)
[
1
κ
Fx (t) − λ
κ
Fl(t)
]
,
Vii (t) = Vcc(t)Fl(t)2 + Vc(t)Fll(t),
Vkk(t) = Vcc(t)
[
1
κ
Fx (t) − λ
κ
Fl(t)
]
+ Vc(t)
[
1
κ2
Fxx (t) − 2λ
κ2
Fxl(t) + λ
2
κ2
Fll(t)
]
,
Vik(t) = Vcc(t)Fl(t)
[
λ
κ
Fl(t) − 1
κh
Fx (t)
]
+ Vc(t)
[
λ
κ
Fll(t) − 1
κ
Flx (t)
]
.
Thus, one obtains for the functional differential equation system (A.11)–(A.12):
i˙(t) = Vi (t)
Vii (t)
(γ + ρ) + Vk(t+σ)
Vii (t)
exp[−ρσ ] + Vik(t)
Vii (t)
(γ k(t) − i(t−σ)),
k˙(t) = i(t−σ) − γ k(t). (A.13)
11 Differentiate Eq. (16c) with respect to t , insert in Eq. (16d) and solve for i˙h .
12 For an introduction to functional differential equations see Asea and Zak (1999, Sect. 2) and Gandolfo
(1996, Chap. 27). A detailed exposition for linear functional differential equations is given in Bellman and
Cooke (1963), and Hale (1977).
13 The system of functional differential Eqs. (A.11)–(A.12) may also exhibit so called limit-cycles, i.e.,
the optimal paths oscillate around the stationary state without converging toward or diverging from it
(e.g., Feichtinger et al. 1994; Asea and Zak 1999; Liski et al. 2001 and Wirl 1995,1999,2002).
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In the linear approximation around the stationary state (23), the differential equation
system (A.13) yields:
i˙(t) ≈ (γ + ρ)(i(t) − i	) + Vik
Vii
exp[−ρσ ](i(t+σ) − i	) − Vik
Vii
(i(t−σ) − i	)
+ Vik
Vii
(2γ + ρ)(k(t) − k	) + Vkk
Vii
exp[−ρσ ](k(t+σ) − k	) + i	,
k˙(t) ≈ (i(t−σ) − i	) − γ (k(t) − k	) + k	.
(A.14)
Linear functional differential equations are also called differential-difference equations.
Similar to the case of ordinary linear first-order differential equations, the elementary solu-
tions for ih and kh are exponential functions, and the general solution is given by the super-
position of the elementary solutions
i(t) = i	 +
∑
n
in exp[xnt], k(t) = k	 +
∑
n
kn exp[xnt], (A.15)
where the in and kn denote constants which can (at least in principle) be unambiguously
determined by the set of initial conditions and the transversality condition. The eigenvalues
xn are the roots of the characteristic polynomial Q(x). The characteristic polynomial Q(x)
for the system of differential-difference equations (A.14) is given by the determinant of the
Jacobian of (A.14) minus the identity matrix times x :
Q(x) = x2 − x
[
ρ + Vik
Vii
(exp[σ(x − ρ)] − exp[−σ x])
]
− Vik
Vii
exp[−σ x](ρ + 2γ ) − Vkk
Vii
exp[−ρσ ] − γ (γ + ρ). (A.16)
Q(x) is a quasi-polynomial, which exhibits an infinite number of complex roots. To deter-
mine whether the stationary state is a saddle point, one needs to determine the signs of the
real parts of the characteristic roots. In fact, the characteristic polynomial Q(x) has an infinite
number of roots with negative real part and an infinite number of roots with positive real part
and, thus, the stationary state is a saddle point.
To see this, note first that the characteristic roots are symmetric around ρ/2, i.e., if x0
is a characteristic root, then ρ − x0 is also a characteristic root (one can easily verify that
Q(x0) = Q(ρ − x0)). Second, we introduce the new variable y = σ x and multiply Q with
σ 2 exp[y]
Q(y) = y2 exp[y] − σ y
[
ρ exp[y] + Vik
Vii
(exp[2y − ρσ ] − 1)
]
−σ 2
[
Vik
Vii
(2γ + ρ) − Vkk
Vii
exp[y − ρσ ] − γ (γ + ρ) exp[y]
]
, (A.17)
in order to apply Theorem 13.1 of Bellman and Cooke (1963, p. 441). As Q(y) has no
principal term, i.e., a term where the highest power of y and the highest exponential term
appear jointly,14 Q(y) has “an unbounded number of zeros with arbitrarily large positive real
part” (ibid). But as the characteristic roots are symmetric around ρ/2, this also implies an
unbounded number of roots with arbitrarily large negative real part.
14 In this case, the principal term would be a term with y2 exp[2y].
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